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Abstract 
This study examines the gender dimension of the brain drain in Turkey to argue that gender 
inequality in sending countries can be a push factor for women. Considering how the political, 
social and cultural atmosphere damages gender equality in Turkey due to a shift toward a 
conservative, authoritarian regime over the last decade, the paper uses an online survey to 
analyze the gender gap in the return intentions of Turkish professionals and students living 
abroad. The findings clearly reveal a gender gap in return intentions regardless of other main 
factors such as age, study field/occupation or marital status. The study also highlights the 
significant correlation between the gender gap in migration decisions and gender inequality in 
Turkey’s labor market.  
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1. Introduction 
The international literature on the gender dimension of migration of highly skilled women is 
rather sparse. Existing studies show that there has been a steady increase in the number of high 
skilled female migrants in OECD countries, explained by the rise in women’s schooling rate and 
increasing tendency to move (Dumont et al. 2007; Docquier et al. 2007; Docquier et al. 2012). 
Docquier et al. (2009) claim that educated women are better able than uneducated women to 
escape from sexual discrimination in their countries of origin. Feminist literature argues that 
gender disparities in education, labor force participation rates, and income levels in origin 
countries are important push factors for skilled female migrants.  
Only a few studies have even partially focused on the topic in Turkey. However, 
considering the increasing gender inequality in Turkey due to a shift towards a more 
authoritarian regime with Islamic roots over the last decade, it is important to investigate 
Turkey’s brain drain with a particular focus on its gender dimension. The main question is 
whether there are differences between highly skilled women and men migrants regarding their 
decisions to emigrate and work abroad, and, if so, whether they mention different push and pull 
factors. To this end, this study quantitatively analyzes the return intentions of students and 
professionals living abroad to provide a comprehensive picture of gender inequality in Turkey. 
We show that the push factors emphasized by women respondents and gender disparities in 
Turkey’s labor market mirror each other.   
We examine the gender dimension of the brain drain by using survey data from 200 
Turkish students and professionals living abroad who responded to two comprehensive online 
questionnaires conducted between late 2015 and early 2016. 
Our findings support most of the previous findings of the literature, and suggest that 
some have become more significant over time. For instance, political instability has become a 
more dominant push factor than other push factors. The key finding of this work, however, is 
that Turkish women have a higher tendency than men to emigrate and remain abroad, and that 
this is more because of push factors than pull factors. One particularly significant push factor in 
the migration decisions of these highly skilled women is the high level of gender disparity in 
Turkey, which disadvantages women in education and labor markets. 
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The following section reviews the literature on the gender dimension of brain drain along 
with empirical studies of the brain drain in Turkey and its gender dimension. The third section 
presents the results of the quantitative analysis while the fourth section discusses the results to 
provide a comprehensive picture of gender inequality in Turkey. The final section summarizes 
the findings. 
2. Gender Dimension of Brain Drain 
2.1.  International Literature on the Gender Dimension of the Brain Drain 
According to one recent study, the number of highly skilled women migrants in OECD 
countries increased from 5.7 million to 14.4 million between 1990 and 2010 to surpass the 
number of highly skilled men migrants (Pekkala Kerr et al. 2016, p.5). 
Analyses of the causes of this development have investigated both push and pull factors. 
Among the push factors, the gender gap in education play an important role in that the strong 
growth towards the end of the 20th century in the proportion of more highly skilled women 
emigrants among the total number of skilled migrants is considered to be mainly related to the 
rise in women’s schooling levels and their increasing tendency to move at (Dumont et al. 2007; 
Docquier et al. 2007). Newer data from Docquier et al. (2009) on numbers of emigrants and rates 
of emigration show that highly skilled women are emigrating at a higher rate than men. More 
specifically, the average migration rates of females with post-secondary education are 17 per 
cent higher than those of males, and this is also strongly correlated with the gender gap in 
educational attainment of the source population, reﬂecting unequal access to education. They 
argue that educated women are better able than uneducated women to escape gender 
discrimination in their countries of origin.  
Bang and Mitra (2011) reached similar conclusions regarding the role of access to 
education in comparing the brain drain for men and women. Looking at gender bias in access to 
education and in outcomes like labor force participation rates and income levels, they found that 
bias in access to educational opportunities and higher female fertility rates are both important 
push factors. In countries where women have more equal access to education and lower fertility 
rates, women brain drain rates are lower and vice versa in countries with a wider gender gap in 
education and higher fertility rates. Finally, they found that the quality of political institutions 
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affects brain drain of both genders similarly. However, critical approaches to brain drain 
discourse from a feminist perspective argue that, even when political conditions are considered 
as a factor influencing decision making, neither gender differences in the experience of political, 
social and cultural conditions nor the career aspirations of highly skilled women are adequately 
taken into account (Parvati 2009). 
To fill the gap in the gender-specific aspects of the brain drain literature, Nejad (2013) 
looked at the effects of women’s rights on the gender gap in highly-skilled migration. She argued 
that although women in countries with very low levels of women’s rights lack the freedom to 
migrate, just a small increase in a country’s women’s rights index increases the female brain 
drain rate. Nejad and Young (2014) then explored women’s rights as a determinant of the female 
brain drain rate relative to that of men, using women’s economic, social and political rights 
indices from the CIRI Human Rights Dataset and migration flows across OECD and non-OECD 
countries. They concluded that when women’s rights levels are higher in the destination country 
than the origin country, highly-skilled women are more likely to migrate than men. 
The influence of women’s rights in origin and destination countries on women’s 
migration decisions is not limited to highly skilled female migrants. Using Gallup World Polls 
between 2009 and 2013, and measuring gender discrimination in terms of the proportion of 
female respondents stating that women in their country are not treated with respect and dignity 
and their desire to migrate, Ruyssen and Salomone (2015) claim that “[o]verall we find that 
women who do not feel treated with respect and dignity in their country have a stronger desire to 
move out. Perceived gender discrimination hence positively affects the size of potential female 
migration” (p.6-7). However, highly skilled, employed and secular women are more likely to 
turn their plans into action (ibid p.13). One concrete example is the case of Iran. After Khomeini 
and the Islamic government took power in Iran, the number of individuals with tertiary education 
and special skills emigrating from Iran increased enormously with a large proportion being 
women escaping religious and ideological restrictions and gender-based discrimination 
(Chaichian 2011). 
The gender dimension of the migration decision has been noted other studies as well. 
Nowak (2009) argued that worsening socio-economic conditions in Ghana led to flexibility in 
gender norms toward migration among female nurses. Focusing on scientists and engineers and 
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students, Zweig and Changgui 1995 showed that Chinese women are less likely to want to return 
from the US to China as they have more opportunities for career advancement in the US (cited in 
Murakami 2009). Murakami (2009) also notes that a similar situation in the case of Japan, in line 
with Ono and Piper (2004).  
Spadavechhia (2013) claims that women from Sub-Saharan Africa move to Europe to 
escape from an environment shaped by strict gender roles that confine them to the household and 
restrict their access to credit, land and means of production. A very similar situation is noted by 
Reynolds (2006) for professional women in Nigeria. Klüsener et al. (2015), using a data set 
prepared by Statistics Lithuania covering Lithuania’s entire population in 2011 and linked with 
data on emigration, found that persistent gender inequality is one possible factor why highly 
educated women are more likely to emigrate than their male peers. Finally, Alberts and Hazen 
(2005) report the effect of differing gender roles between the US and the home countries of 
international students on their (non-)return intentions. 
Some researchers, on the other hand, argue that gender inequality is not a significant push 
factor. Based on original indices for gender inequality in labor market and migration data 
provided by Docquier et al. (2009) covering 1991-2001, Baudassé and Bazillier (2014) did not 
confirm the theory that gender inequality in origin countries can be a push factor for women., 
Similarly, based on data obtained from Botswanan students in their final year in tertiary 
education between October 2002 and January 2003, Campbell (2007) found no significant 
gender differences in intention to emigrate. The study also found that men are more likely to 
prefer to migrate alone. Bartolini et al. (2017), based on a survey conducted in 2013, also failed 
to find any general gender differences in migration decisions. Finally, Rangelova (2006) showed 
that, although there is no noticeable differences between men and women in their purposes for 
migrating, women are more likely to resettle abroad than men. The study also found that Turkish 
women are more likely to migrate than other ethnicities, specifically from the Bulgarian and 
Roma communities. 
2.2.  Literature on the Brain Drain in Turkey 
During the 1960s, Turkey was a sending country for western European labor markets, especially 
Germany, to fulfil their demand for low-skilled manual workers. The general characteristics of 
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this migration can be explained in terms of traditional push and pull factors (Martin 1991), with 
the dominant feature of the migrant workers being their low skill levels. More specifically, 
according to Docquier et al. (2007, p.18), out of the top 30 migrant sending countries, Turkey 
was the fifth largest in 2000 but fourth to last in proportion of skilled emigrants. These 
comprised only 9 per cent of Turkey’s total emigrants, and of these only 36.5 per cent were 
women – the lowest rate of all 30 countries. Turkey also had the worst figures considering 
migratory movements in terms of countries of origin and destination, with only 6.3 per cent of 
Turkish migrants in Germany in 2000 being highly skilled, of which 45.8 per cent were women 
(Docquier et al. 2011). The USA is another important destination country for the brain drain 
from Turkey. Of the OECD countries, which are the preferred destination countries for highly 
skilled migrants, the USA, United Kingdom, Canada and Australia received 70 per cent in 2010, 
with the USA alone taking 41 per cent (Pekkala Kerr et al. 2016, p.4). The USA is also the most 
preferred destination country for highly skilled migrants from Turkey. According to an 
International Institute of Education Report, there were 10,691 Turkish students in the USA 
during the 2015/16 academic year, making Turkey the thirteenth largest source country, while 
469 Turkish students on temporary visas took doctorate degrees in 2015 (387 science and 
engineering, 82 other fields), rising from 390 in 2005, ranking sixth after China, India, South 
Korea, Iran and Taiwan.  
Despite a sizeable literature on Turkey’s migration issue, few studies have focused on the 
brain drain specifically, including empirical research to investigate the migration of highly 
skilled workers.  
Empirical studies provide a detailed picture of the brain drain in Turkey (see Elveren 
2016 for a comprehensive analysis). Early studies from the late 1960s and early 1970s found that 
the key reason for intending to migrate or remain abroad was low wages in Turkey, although 
greater opportunities to specialize, and hierarchical authority and political pressures in Turkey 
were mentioned (Dirican et al. 1968; Kösemen 1968; Oğuzkan 1971; The Turkish Chambers of 
Engineers and Architects 1972; Uysal 1972). 
During the 2000s, new research provided a more comprehensive analysis, dealing with 
more aspects of migration and applying statistical methods. In addition to low wages and career 
concerns (Öztürk 2001; Güngör and Tansel 2014; Akman 2014), participants often mentioned 
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lack of respect for science and academics in Turkey, lack of freedom of expression, workplace 
dissatisfaction and political instability as main push factors (Öztürk 2001; Güngör and Tansel 
2008b; Gökbayrak 2009; and Pazarcık 2010).  
Finally, over the last decade, while wage differentials between resident countries and 
Turkey specifically or life standards in general have become secondary factors, political 
instability and lack of academic freedom or dissatisfaction with general science policy or 
Turkey’s higher education system have become major push factors in emigrants’ decisions to 
stay abroad. Esen (2014), for example, reports that stayers value research opportunities more 
than their wages, given that Turkey’s private universities currently provide a better deal once 
salary and fringe benefits are considered. For non-returners, lack of academic freedom, fewer 
academic opportunities and political instability outweigh Turkey’s recent economic growth 
(ibid).  
Although none of these studies offers a gender perspective on the brain drain, a few 
nevertheless provide important, contrasting findings on gender differences in migration and/or 
return decisions. For example, Akman (2014) found that male students are more likely to intend 
to work and settle abroad; Mollahaliloğlu et al. (2014) reported that the male physicians are 1.5 
times more likely to wish to live abroad; Öztürk (2001) found that female students were not 
significantly more likely to return to Turkey after graduating than male students; finally, 
Gökbayrak (2009) could not show gender differences in return decisions due to the limited 
number of female respondents. 
According to Güngör and Tansel (2008a), women students show less tendency to return 
to Turkey than men, perhaps due to the gender gap in Turkey’s labor market and less freedom in 
social life (p. 3073). On the other hand, Güngör and Tansel (2008b) report that familial issues are 
more important than individual ones for female professionals ones regarding return decisions 
while Güngör and Tansel (2014) showed that females are more likely to report their intention to 
stay abroad than males.  
3. A Survey on the Brain Drain in Turkey 
Data was collected using two on-line questionnaires, accessible for about 5 months from 
late 2015 to early 2016: a 46-item questionnaire in English for professionals and a 53-item 
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questionnaire in both Turkish and in English for students. The questionnaires were mainly based 
on Güngör (2003) for comparison purposes.  
Detailed descriptive statistics and questionnaire responses for the 116 students and 84 
professionals who replied to all questions in the relevant survey are presented below in order to 
measure their intentions (not) to return.  
Both groups of emigrants are relatively young, with 82 per cent of students younger than 
30 and 77.4 per cent of professionals younger than 40 years old. There is a relatively equal 
gender distribution: 41.4 (58.6) per cent of students and 33.3 (66.7) per cent of professionals are 
female (male), with 38 per cent of all participants being female and 62 per cent male. This 
reasonably balanced distribution enabled us to investigate further possible differentiation.   
While 63 per cent of professionals come from İstanbul, Ankara or İzmir, only about 40 
per cent of students were born in these three cities. The rest (about 60 per cent) of students come 
from 46 different provinces across the country. A significant percentage of both students (86.1 
per cent) and professionals (82.1 per cent) reside in the US, followed by the UK, Canada and 
other major European countries.  
Regarding qualifications, 42.2 per cent of students’ highest degree are master’s degrees 
while 30.2 per cent hold a bachelor’s degree and 18.1 per cent a Ph.D. degree. Only 8.3 per cent 
of professionals only hold a bachelor’s degree while 61.9 per cent have a Ph.D. and 26.2 have 
master’s degrees. Of the professionals, 41.7 per cent hold academic positions while 58.3 per cent 
have non-academic positions. Only 17.9 per cent of professionals received their highest degree 
from an institution in Turkey, with 73.8 per cent gaining their highest degree in the USA. 
Conversely, 64.7 per cent of students earned their highest degree in Turkey, compared to 26.7 
per cent from the USA.    
Respondents were drawn from both natural science and social sciences, and not restricted 
to a few occupational categories like doctors or engineers. While 56.4 per cent of students are in 
natural sciences, 43.6 per cent are in social sciences. For professionals, the same ratios are 60.7 
per cent and 39.3 per cent, respectively. This relatively balanced distribution of fields allowed us 
to investigate possible differentiations between these two broad fields.  
 Our study confirms previous general findings on intentions to migrate and return 
decisions. One of the most significant results is the positive relationship between initial and 
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current return decisions (see Table 1), which confirms the findings of Gökbayrak (2009) and 
Güngör and Tansel (2008a, 2008b, 2014).  
  
Table 1: Correlations between initial current return intentions 
Sample Pearson Spearman Kendall 
All 0.370*** 0.361*** 0.320*** 
Students 0.456*** 0.441*** 0.397*** 
Professionals  0.257** 0.311*** 0.287*** 
Male 0.376*** 0.370*** 0.325*** 
Female 0.368*** 0.336*** 0.304*** 
Note: *, ** and *** refer to significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 1 shows that there is a significant positive relationship between current and initial 
return intentions for all occupation groups and genders according to three basic correlation tests. 
Table 2, however, shows that although there is a positive correlation between ‘stay duration 
abroad’ and ‘initial non-return intention’ for students and females, that relationship, as expected, 
is more significant between ‘stay duration’ and ‘current non-return intention’ for all groups. This 
highly significant result demonstrates the impact of time spend abroad on non-return decisions, 
supporting Güngör and Tansel (2008a, 2008b, 2014). 
   
 
Table 2: Correlations between initial and current non-return intentions and stay duration    
 Initial non-return intention Current non-return intention 
Sample Pearson Spearman Kendall Pearson Spearman Kendall 
All 0.166** 0.132* 0.114* 0.339*** 0.310*** 0.256*** 
Students 0.245*** 0.209** 0.183** 0.394*** 0.398*** 0.331*** 
Professionals  0.050 0.020 0.014 0.283*** 0.240** 0.204** 
Male 0.092 0.063 0.052 0.297*** 0.289*** 0.236*** 
Female 0.293** 0.238** 0.211** 0.408*** 0.318*** 0.270*** 
Note: *, ** and *** refer to significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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As expected, age and initial return decision is not significantly correlated. However, for 
all groups except professionals, age is positively associated with current non-return decision 
(Table 3), which is also in line with Güngör and Tansel (2008a, 2008b, 2014), presumably 
because the costs of migration may be higher for older people, as argued by Güngör (2003). 
 
Table 3: Correlations between initial non-return intention and age group  
Sample Pearson Spearman Kendall Pearson Spearman Kendall 
All 0.074 0.430 0.037 0.412*** 0.414*** 0.352*** 
Students -0.057 -0.076 -0.067 0.236** 0.237** 0.206** 
Professionals  0.135 0.130 0.118 0.104 0.089 0.080 
Male 0.071 0.043 0.037 0.408*** 0.416*** 0.348*** 
Female 0.078 0.043 0.037 0.430*** 0.421*** 0.371*** 
 Note: *, ** and *** refer to significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
The study’s second main finding is that both students and professionals who received 
their degree from a foreign university are more to not intend to return, which also supports 
Güngör and Tansel (2008a, 2008b, 2014), although this is not true for initial return intentions. 
Third, social science graduates (both students and professionals) graduates are more likely to 
intend to return than natural science graduates.  
Finally, there is a highly significant negative correlation between length of experience 
abroad and current return intention. That is, those who have spent more time abroad are less 
likely to intend to return; those who initially decided to stay abroad are likely to intend to stay 
currently, and this decision becomes stronger over time.  
Our study also reveals some significant gender differentiations. One difference is that 
current non-return intentions are significantly higher than initial non-return intentions for 
women.    
Table 4 shows the differences between initial and current stay intentions by occupational 
group and gender. While the proportion of male students intending to stay increased by 50 per 
cent (from 13.2 to 17.7 per cent), it increased by almost 100 per cent for female students (from 
14.6 to 27.0 per cent). Similarly, the proportion of male professionals intending to stay increased 
by 100 per cent (from 23.2 to 50 per cent), the increase was over 250 per cent for female 
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professionals (from 17.9 to 64.3 per cent). It seems reasonable to argue that women are more 
likely to appreciate living abroad due to the greater opportunities there (or the lack of 
opportunities in their home country).  
 
Table 4: Initial and current return intentions (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The second finding is that females are more likely to go abroad again. Those who 
reported their intention to return were also asked if they planned to return abroad again. Table 5 
presents the answers to this question by gender. 
 
Table 5: Plan to go abroad again by occupation and gender (%) 
 Students Professionals Total 
 Male Femal
e 
Total Male Femal
e 
Total Male Femal
e 
Total 
Yes 24.5 43.8 31.8 10.7 20.0 13.2 19.8 38.1 26.0 
Maybe 52.8 43.8 49.4 75.0 40.0 65.8 60.5 42.9 54.5 
No 22.6 12.5 18.8 14.3 40.0 21.2 19.8 19.1 19.5 
N 53 32 85 28 10 38 81 42 123 
Students: Chi Squared (2) = 3.744; Professionals: Chi Squared (2) = 4.169; Total: Chi Squared 
(2) = 5.163* Note: * refers to significance at the 10% level. 
 Initial return intentions 
 Students Professionals 
 Male Female Total Male Female Total 
Return  57.4 45.8 52.6 42.9 57.1 47.6 
Undecided  29.4 39.6 33.6 33.9 25.0 31.0 
Stay  13.2 14.6 13.8 23.2 17.9 21.4 
 Current return intentions 
Return  54.4 35.5 46.5 7.1 3.6 6.0 
Undecided  27.9 37.5 31.9 42.9 32.1 39.3 
Stay  17.7 27.0 21.6 50 64.3 54.7 
n 68 48 116 56 28 84 
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Notably, a higher proportion of students (31.8 per cent) than professionals (13.2 per cent) 
intend to return. There is also a significant difference between genders for both students and 
professionals. While 24.5 per cent of male students plan to return abroad, 43.8 per cent female 
students do. Similarly, nearly twice as many female professionals plan to go abroad again than 
male professionals (20.0 versus 10.7 per cent).     
The third finding, perhaps the most significant one, is the difference in the emphasis that 
female and male students give regarding push factors. Tables 6 and 7 show two important points. 
First, while there are no differences between the push and pull factors reported by male and 
female professionals (except for two cases), there are highly significant gender differences for 
students. Second, particularly for students, the differentiation is far clearer for push than pull 
factors. 
 
Table 6: Push and pull Factors rated as ’important’ or ‘very important’ (%) 
 
Students Professionals 
 Male 
 
 
Female 
 
Chi 
Squared  
 
 
Male 
 
 
Female 
Chi 
Squared 
PUSH       
Low income in my occupation 57.6 66.7 0.932 61.1 64.3 0.079 
Little opportunity for advancement in occupation 65.2 86.7 6.418** 55.6 82.1 5.702** 
Limited job opportunity in specialty 60.6 75.6 2.691 59.3 75.0 1.999 
No opportunity for advanced training 43.9 66.7 5.556** 37.0 60.7 4.177** 
Away from research centers and advances 63.6 80.0 3.430* 53.7 57.1 0.088 
Lack of financial resources for business 30.3 42.2 1.668 35.2 28.6 0.365 
Less than satisfying social/cultural life 30.3 48.9 3.930** 35.2 39.3 0.135 
Bureaucracy, inefficiencies  71.2 80.0 1.096 79.6 78.6 0.013 
Political pressures, discord 66.7 84.4 4.382** 85.2 89.3 0.267 
Lack of social security 48.5 68.9 4.539** 61.1 57.1 0.121 
Economic instability, uncertainty 58.1 84.4 8.094*** 81.5 89.3 0.842 
PULL       
Higher salary or wage 68.2 64.4 0.168 66.7 78.6 1.262 
Greater advancement opportunity in profession 80.3 88.9 1.452 77.8 85.7 0.740 
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Better work environment 65.5 77.8 2.042 66.7 82.1 2.188 
Greater job availability in specialization 72.7 77.8 0.362 70.4 78.6 0.632 
Greater opportunities to develop specialty 77.2 88.9 2.444 79.6 71.4 0.697 
More organized, ordered environment 65.2 80.0 2.875* 77.8 85.7 0.740 
More satisfying social/cultural life 37.9 53.3 2.592 50.0 39.3 0.851 
Proximity to research and innovation centers 68.2 80.0 1.895 59.3 64.3 0.196 
Spouse’s preference or job 28.8 35.6 0.568 48.2 50.0 0.025 
Better educational opportunities for children 
25.8 60.0 13.112**
* 
64.8 67.9 0.076 
Need to finish /continue with current project 25.8 44.4 4.205** 31.5 25.0 0.374 
N 66 45  54 28  
Note: *, ** and *** refer to significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Table 7: Push and pull factors rated as ’important’ or ‘very important’ (%) (students and 
professionals) 
 male 
 
 
female 
 
Chi  
Squared 
PUSH    
Low income in my occupation 59.2 65.8 0.833 
Little opportunities for advancement in occupation 60.8 84.9 12.539*** 
Limited job opportunities in specialty 60.0 75.3 4.748** 
No opportunity for advanced training 40.8 64.4 10.070*** 
Away from research centers and advances 59.2 71.2 2.859* 
Lack of financial resources for business 32.5 37.0 0.406 
Less satisfying social/cultural life 32.5 45.2 3.133* 
Bureaucracy, inefficiencies  75.0 79.5 0.503 
Political pressures, discord 75.0 86.3 3.528* 
Lack of social security 54.2 64.4 1.945 
Economic instability, uncertainty 69.2 86.3 7.234*** 
PULL    
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Higher salary or wage 67.5 69.9 0.117 
Greater advancement opportunity in profession 79.2 87.7 2.262 
Better work environment 65.8 79.5 4.087** 
Greater job availability in specialization 71.2 78.1 0.973 
Greater opportunities to develop specialty 79.3 82.2 0.419 
More organized, ordered environment 70.8 82.2 3.134* 
More satisfying social/cultural life 43.3 48.0 0.390 
Proximity to research and innovation centers 64.2 74.0 2.002 
Spouse’s preference or job 37.5 41.1 0.247 
Better educational opportunities for children 43.3 63.0 7.034*** 
Need to finish /continue with current project 28.3 37.0 1.572 
N 120 73  
Note: *, ** and *** refer to significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
The findings in Table 6 and 7 deserve a closer look as there is a clear overlap between the 
factors that women emphasize statistically significantly more than men and the gender gap in 
Turkey’s labor market, particularly regarding “little opportunities for advancement in 
occupation”, “limited job opportunities in specialty” “no opportunity for advanced training”, 
“less satisfying social/cultural life”, “political pressures, discord” and “economic instability, 
uncertainty”.   
 Regarding pull factors, it is striking, but perhaps not unexpected, that while “better 
educational opportunities for children” is an important pull factor for only 25.8 percent of male 
students, it is considered important by 60 percent of female students.     
Finally, we used a regression analysis to test if being female affected return intentions. 
The results presented in Table 8 suggest a weak association between being female and non-return 
intention. According to Model 1, initially expressing intention to stay, being initially undecided 
and having support from the family increase the likelihood of non-return intentions. Similarly, 
being professional, being female, staying abroad for longer and being in a higher age group also 
increase non-return intentions. Model 2, which included all pull and push factors, indicated that 
being female and staying abroad for longer time do not significantly increase the probability of 
non-return intentions. All other the significant variables in Model 1 were significant in Model 2 
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as well. Model 2 shows that those who emphasize the push factors of low income in one’s 
occupation and bureaucracy, inefficiencies and the pull factors of greater job availability in 
specialization and better educational opportunity for children are more likely to express non-
return intentions. 
 
Table 8: A Regression Analysis of non-return intentions 
No Model1 Model 2 
Female 0.497* 
(0.280) 
0.369 
(0.332) 
Age 0.399** 
(0.180) 
0.444** 
(0.202) 
Age2 -0.005** 
(0.003) 
-0.006** 
(0.003) 
Initial return decision (undecided) 1.021*** 
(0.303) 
1.351*** 
(0.347) 
Initial return decision (stay) 1.990*** 
(0.439) 
2.465*** 
(0.484) 
Stay duration 0.087** 
(0.042) 
0.059 
(0.049) 
Family support 0.514*** 
(0.148) 
0.509*** 
(0.174) 
Professional 0.765* 
(0.411) 
1.013** 
(0.447) 
Push Factors 
  
Low income in my occupation 
 0.960** 
(0.440) 
Little opportunities for advancement in occupation 
 -0.259 
(0.520) 
Limited job opportunities in specialty 
 -0.457 
(0.438) 
No opportunity for advanced training 
 0.028 
(0.438) 
Away from research centers and advances 
 0.124 
(0.452) 
Lack of financial resources for business 
 -0.251 
(0.341) 
Less satisfying social/cultural life 
 0.341 
(0.374) 
Bureaucracy, inefficiencies  
 0.771* 
(0.459) 
Political pressures, discord 
 0.332 
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(0.544) 
Lack of social security 
 -0.572 
(0.388) 
Economic instability, uncertainty 
 0.165 
(0.482) 
Pull Factors 
  
Higher salary or wage 
 -0.242 
(0.437) 
Greater advancement opportunity in profession 
 0.763 
(0.592) 
Better work environment 
 -0.241 
(0.442) 
Greater job availability in specialization 
 1.080** 
(0.489) 
Greater opportunities to develop specialty 
 -0.128 
(0.540) 
More organized, ordered environment 
 -0.299 
(0.446) 
More satisfying social/cultural life 
 0.233 
(0.380) 
Proximity to research and innovation centers 
 0.025 
(0.413) 
Spouse’s preference or job 
 -0.133 
(0.346) 
Better educational opportunities for children 
 0.692* 
(0.374) 
Need to finish /continue with current project 
 -0.486 
(0.358) 
Observations 199 192 
Note: *, ** and *** refer to significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
4. The Gender Gap and Gender Inequality in Turkey 
 As reported above, this study found a strong overlap between the push and pull factors 
that females emphasize in Table 7 in and the gender gap in Turkey’s labor market. In this 
section, we explain how gender inequality in Turkey is a major push factor for females in Turkey 
regarding decisions to emigrate and not return once they are abroad. 
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Gender Gap and Women’s Rights in Turkey 
According to the UN Human Development Index 2016, Turkey ranks 71st with an index 
value of 0.767 (0.724 for females and 0.797 for males) among countries with high human 
development. In the Gender Development Index (2015), Turkey has an index value of 0.908, 
placing it in the fourth group comprising countries with medium to low gender equality in HDI 
achievements. Besides gender differences in expected and mean years of schooling, there is a 
major gap in estimated gross national income per capita (in 2011 PPP $) of 10,648$ for females 
and 27,035$ for males. 
Regarding the Gender Inequality Index (2015), Turkey has a value of 0.328, placing it 
69th. More specifically, whereas 43.5 per cent of females have at least some secondary 
education, 64.8 per cent of males do. The labor force participation rate is 30.4 per cent for 
females but 71.4 per cent for males. This huge gender disparity in labor force participation helps 
explain the massive gender gap in gross national income per capita mentioned above. Finally, 
women hold only 14.9 per cent of parliamentary seats, highlighting the low level of women’s 
political representation in Turkey.   
Because Turkey’s EU candidateship requires harmonization with the EU acquis during 
the accession period starting in 2004, the government in Turkey has revised the legislature from 
the perspective of gender equality, removing almost every discriminatory aspect in laws and 
directives. Nevertheless, discriminatory mentalities and practices continue. Thus, indices dealing 
with gender inequalities need to go beyond legal regulations to capture the real dimensions of 
inequalities. According to the country scores and sub-indices in the OECD Social Institutions & 
Gender Index Synthesis Report (2014), Turkey has a low level of discrimination regarding 
discriminatory family codes, restricted physical integrity, and restricted resources and assets but 
a high level of discrimination against daughters and restricted civil liberties (p.62). 
The report also notes that challenges remain across OECD countries regarding unpaid 
care work, on which women spend on average more than twice as much time as men. However, 
in Japan, Korea and Turkey, this increases to five times more (ibid, p.26) The unequal 
distribution of paid and unpaid work between men and women in Turkey is the leading injustice 
in the country’s social structure, which has both economic and political consequences, 
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manifested in low female employment, a large gender wage gap and low female political 
representation. 
In the Gallup and ILO survey on women and work, differences in the answers given by 
men and women to various questions show men’s conservative, gender-based perceptions of the 
division of labor regarding women’s employment in Turkey. While 34 per cent of Turkish 
women wanted to work in a paid job, 12 per cent wanted to stay at home and 53 per cent said 
they wanted both.  In contrast, only 28 per cent of men preferred that the women in their family 
work in a paid job, while 32 per cent preferred that they stay at home and 34 per cent preferred 
both. Even 18 per cent of men with tertiary education wanted women in their family to stay at 
home (p. 205). These values place Turkey among countries with the largest gender gaps in 
opinion about women’s work. Whereas the percentages of women who would like to have paid 
jobs or do both paid work and care for the home are 70 per cent globally and 87 per cent for 
women in Turkey, for men, they are 66 per cent globally and 62 per cent for men in Turkey, 
revealing a gap of 25 per cent (p.18).  
According to the Polity IV Index 2016, Turkey is a country with open anocracy. This 
categorization of Turkey as a regime of partial democracy and partial dictatorship has shifted 
further towards authoritarianism following the constitutional referendum on the 16th of April 
2017, accepted by 51.4 per cent of voters, but which took place under a state of emergency. 
According to the Venice Commission, these constitutional amendments will excessively 
concentrate executive power in the hands of the president, weaken parliamentary control of that 
power and curtail the independence of the judiciary vis-à-vis the president. These political 
developments may also increase the brain drain from Turkey as educated people prefer to live in 
more democratic and politically stable environments as well as to have freer, westernized 
lifestyles, individually and socially.2  
The international indicators regarding women’s rights and gender equalities mentioned 
above highlight the gender disparities in Turkey that disadvantage women in education and labor 
markets as important factors in the migration decisions of highly skilled females. To deal with 
                                                          
2 Turkey has been experiencing a substantial brain drain since 2016, especially with the (seemingly permanent) state 
of emergency after the military coup attempt. Several sources report the alarming situation of Turkey’s brain drain. 
See Arslan (2016), Bulut and Cindemir (2016), Estukyan (2016), Gazete Duvar (2017), Kamiloğlu (2016), 
Kınıklıoğlu (2014), T24 (2016) and Yedikardes (2017). 
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this issue more comprehensively, we can look at more detailed comparative statistics on tertiary 
education and professional occupations for men and women in Turkey. 
Education 
The gender gap in education in Turkey manifests itself with the following TurkStat 
gender indicators. In 2015, in the population aged 25 years and older, for every 100 female 
primary school graduates there are 76 men; for every 100 female high school graduates there are 
151 men; and for every 100 female higher education graduates there are 136 men. That is, fewer 
women than men were able to attend secondary and tertiary education. However, since the 
adoption of 8-year compulsory schooling in 1997 and 12-year compulsory schooling in 2012, 
enrolment rates of female students has started to increase.  
Although females comprise 45.9 per cent of all higher education students, their enrolment 
rate overtook males’ in 2015 with 42.6 per cent versus 39.2 per cent so a gender balance in the 
number of higher education students can be expected in the coming years. Unsurprisingly, 
however, higher education fields are gendered. Whereas there are 57 men for every 100 women 
in language and literature, there are 237 men for every 100 women in technical sciences. 
However, although women are unsurprisingly concentrated in health sciences, social sciences 
and art, it is interesting to see that female students outnumber male students in mathematics and 
natural sciences in Turkey with 100 women for every 72 men. Another interesting statistic is the 
share of female students in engineering, manufacturing and construction with 29.4 per cent and 
medicine 49.4 per cent, as these areas tend to be rather difficult for female students to access in 
many countries. Similarly, 30.8 per cent of master’s degree students in engineering, 
manufacturing and construction are currently women. This has long historical roots in Turkey in 
the ideological approach of successive governments after the foundation of the Republic in 1923 
who considered that improving women’s social and political status and supporting their rights in 
higher education and employment in professional jobs was integral to Turkey’s westernization 
process. Adopting a rationalist, positivist world view, they promoted natural and technical 
sciences and influenced women from middle upper-class families in their choices of these study 
fields (Acar 1983).  
The current education data is consistent with the literature on the female brain drain 
pointing to factors like the gender gap in educational attainment and the rise in women’s 
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schooling levels, especially in tertiary education. In Turkey, the existing gender gap has 
encouraged the rather limited number of highly skilled women to migrate, and we can expect this 
tendency to strengthen with the increasing enrolment of female students in higher education. 
Conditions conducive for women’s choices in natural and technical sciences facilitate the 
realization of their migration intentions. 
The survey data in this study are also consistent with the distribution of female students’ 
study fields, with engineering and technical sciences taking the biggest share among both 
professional women and men. Given the demand of developed countries for professionals in 
engineering and related disciplines, being educated in these fields encourages women’s 
migration from Turkey. We can therefore assume that this may be the main source of the female 
brain drain in Turkey if these women are frustrated with career opportunities in Turkey due to 
various forms of gender discrimination in Turkey’s labor market. 
Labor market 
As mentioned above, women’s labor force participation (LFP) rate is very low in Turkey 
in comparison to OECD countries, despite increasing from 23.3 per cent in 2004 to 32.5 per cent 
in 2016. It is a manifestation of a rigid gender-based division of labor in which women tend to be 
responsible for household and care activities whereas men earn the family’s income. However, 
the LFP rate in Turkey increases with level of education, being 27.2 per cent for women with 
less than secondary education, 33.7 per cent for secondary school graduates and 71.3 per cent for 
tertiary education graduates. The difference between these rates relates to women’s abilities to 
reconcile family and work responsibilities in Turkey. Whereas women with higher education 
earn relative high wages, which enables them to hire care workers or pay for private 
kindergartens, low educated women with low wages usually have to quit their jobs once they 
have children due to Turkey’s lack of affordable public child care facilities (İlkkaracan 2012).  
However, this increase in average labor force participation rate with education level is 
also closely related to higher female unemployment rates, which is particularly high for educated 
women, resulting in a huge gender gap. In 2016, Turkey’s unemployment rates for high school 
graduates was 10.5 per cent for males but 21.1 per cent for females, and for higher education 
graduates it was 8.8 per cent for males and 16.9 per cent for females. That is, women’s 
unemployment rates are almost double those of men’s. Furthermore, between 2004 and 2016, the 
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number of unemployed women increased by 113 per cent but the rise was only 14 per cent for 
men. Such high unemployment rates for educated women may therefore influence their 
migration decisions. 
The occupational distribution of employment coincides with the labor force participation 
characteristics of women. Given the economic, political and cultural obstacles facing low 
educated and unskilled women, their labor force participation rate is low as discussed above. As 
more highly educated women have joined the labor market at a much higher rate, in 2016, 15.4 
per cent of all women were in professional occupations, compared to 8 per cent of men. 
Consequently, women represented 45.9 per cent of all employees in professional occupations, 
which matches the percentage of female university students. However, only 15.1 per cent of 
mangers are women, indicating that educated women face serious obstacles in their career 
advancement, which may influence women’s migration decisions. 
Another indicator of gender inequality is the gender gap in earnings in Turkey. In 2015, 
this was 20.8 per cent in total earnings in favor of men, varying according to status in job. The 
ratio of female income to male income was 54.9 per cent for self-employed workers, 72.1 per 
cent for employers and 86.8% for waged workers. Women in Turkey also earn less than men at 
all levels of education, with the average annual earnings of women with higher education being 
76.7 per cent of men’s. According data from the Household Budget Survey data, 40 per cent of 
the gender wage gap of female university graduates is due to discrimination (Cudeville and 
Gürbüzer 2007).  
In Turkey, a conservative religious party, the Justice and Development Party (JDP) has 
been in power since 2002. A critical assessment of the government’s female employment 
policies indicates that it has replaced previous egalitarian rhetoric with a focus on the importance 
of the family for social continuity, giving women responsibility for maintaining and protecting 
the family. Accordingly, to preserve a gender-based division of labor, the government has 
proposed flexible work options for women, like part-time work and female entrepreneurship, 
which result in precarious forms of employment (Toksöz 2016). 
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Violence against women 
The percentage of women experiencing violence in Turkey at some point in their lives 
was 41.9 per cent in 2008 and 37.5 per cent in 2014. Despite this decrease, the rate remains very 
high, which shows how violence is a serious problem in Turkey that violates women’s basic 
human rights. Considering the probability of suffering physical or sexual violence in relation to 
education level, 43.4 per cent of women who are not educated or who have not completed 
primary education experienced violence in 2014 while for women with high school or higher 
education the rate was 24.7 per cent. Despite this decrease with women’s education level, 
violence remains a problem that cuts across all social groups and strata in Turkey, regardless of 
women’s level of welfare or education.  
Murders of women represent the gravest form of violence, annihilating their right to life. 
At least 1,411 women were killed between 2010 and 2016, with 53.6 per cent of offenders being 
husbands or ex-husbands, 18.8 per cent male relatives and 14.2 per cent boyfriends or ex-
boyfriends. Of these murders, 234 murders were committed during an ongoing separation or 
divorce process while 141 murders occurred although the women had applied to an official 
institution for protection in the face of harassment or threats, which shows the inadequacy of 
measures taken by the public authorities to prevent violence against women.3 Although the JDP 
government has taken legal and institutional measures to combat violence against women, their 
consistent implementation depends on a gender equality mentality, which is lacking in the JDP 
as a religious conservative party. Rather, their equality understanding is limited to a legal 
equality, seeing motherhood as the most important role of women and strengthening family as 
their priority. However, male violence against women in Turkey cannot be combatted without 
concrete steps towards economic, social and political gender equality (Aslan-Akman, Tütüncü 
2013). 
Ruyssen and Salomone (2015) report that women prefer to migrate when they think that 
they are not treated with respect and dignity. Although the problem of violence against women 
has not yet been explicitly considered in migration studies, it is reasonable to argue that women’s 
risk of facing violence in Turkey along with the sexist rhetoric of public authorities is likely to 
strengthen educated women’s desire to emigrate. 
                                                          
3 http://bianet.org/english/gender/134394-bianet-is-monitoring-male-violence 
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5. Conclusion 
This study examined the return intentions of emigrant Turkish students and professionals, 
with a special focus on the gender dimension, which has not received enough attention in both 
Turkey and international studies. The study’s findings, which are based on data from116 students 
and 84 professionals who responded to two comprehensive questionnaires, support most of the 
previous findings in the literature while also providing some new and contrasting results. In 
particular, this study has clarified that political instability in Turkey is a key factor in these 
respondents’ return decisions, and that there are positive relationships between an intention not 
to return and time spent abroad, having a degree from a foreign, English-medium institution and 
previous work/travel/study experience abroad. 
Our findings confirm that previous findings remain valid, and that some have become 
more significant. For instance, political instability as a push factor becomes more dominant than 
other push (and pull) factors. In addition, retrogressive changes in Turkey regarding the role of 
women in society (increasing pressure on women in the public sphere and trying to confine 
women to the private sphere) have made educated Turkish women more likely than men to 
migrate and intend not to return.  
However, the key finding in this study is that more women currently prefer to stay abroad 
than men, and that this is more because of push factors than pull factors. We conclude that this is 
a clear reflection of the way Turkey’s current socio-political situation is strongly influencing 
women’s decisions to migrate and not return. Increasing gender disparities in Turkey that 
disadvantage women in education and labor markets are significant push factors in the migration 
decisions of highly skilled females. We also conclude that increasing authoritarianism and 
Islamization will perpetuate this tendency, causing a huge brain for Turkey. 
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